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Religiosity and Tolerance in the MENA
The Multidimensional Impact of Islamic Religiosity
on Ethno-religious Social Tolerance in the Middle
East and North Africa
Niels Spierings, Radboud University—Radboud Social Cultural Research
Ethno-religious tolerance is crucial for establishing sustainable democracy,which is scarce in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). This study pro-vides an empirically grounded and nuanced critique of Orientalist studies simply
pointing at Islam. It presents a systematic analysis of the impact of religious belong-
ing, belief, and behavior on social tolerance in the MENA, based on 32 uniquely
synchronized Arab Barometer and World Values surveys. This study’s major contribu-
tions are that it (a) provides unique empirical insights into the multifaceted impact of
religiosity on social tolerance in the region, (b) develops the 3-Bs approach to a
context-sensitive framework, and (c) shows that and explains why Islam has both
negative and positive influences. The analyses show (i) that the degree to which peo-
ple identify with their religion has no negative impact on social tolerance, with
exception of the few cases in which Islamist forces hold power; (ii) that under “nor-
mal” circumstances orthodox-literalist believers are more tolerant towards others,
but less so if they feel repressed or threatened in society (which only holds for a few
cases); and (iii) that mosque attendance has a negative impact on ethno-religious
social tolerance, and this effect is particularly strong if conservative Islamist states
coercively regulate religion and its content, such as communication via sermons. All
things considered the multifaceted 3-B approach is found to hold well once the
MENA-specific aspects and its diverse society-state-religion relations are incorpo-
rated as sources of both possible threats and socialization.
Introduction
Recent work shows that the Arab Uprisings and their aftermath dealt a heavy
blow to ethno-religious social tolerance across the region (Spierings 2017). This
is worrisome not just because of the decline in tolerance itself, but also because
of tolerance’s importance for sustainable democracy in general (Lipset 1959;
Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1994; Sullivan and Transue 1999) and
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democratic support in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in particular
(Ciftci 2010; Rizzo, Abdel-Latif, and Meyer 2007; Tessler 2002). While Islam
has gotten much scholarly attention in explaining explicit support for democracy
(e.g., Fish 2002; 2011; Moaddel 2002; Rizzo, Abdel-Latif, and Meyer 2007;
Spierings 2014; Tessler 2002), its impact is largely absent from the MENA liter-
ature discussing ethno-religious tolerance (i.e., the willingness to live in the same
locale as people with a different ethno-religious background).
There are some studies that touch on related issues, though. Based on in-
depth interviews in Oman, Al Sadi and Basit (2013, 447) actually conclude that
youngsters’ religion is crucial in determining their tolerance for people with dif-
ferent worldviews. Spierings (2014) also finds that religious identification has
clear but different effects in five MENA countries, but he leaves out religiosity’s
behavioral dimension and does not address context dependency in depth. So
while there are clear indications that religiosity matters, the impact of different
behavioral and attitudinal dimensions of religion (see Kellstedt et al. 1996;
Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Hello 2002; Stark and Glock 1968) has not yet been
thoroughly theorized or systematically studied for the MENA region (cf. Ciftci
2010; Spierings 2014).
To theorize the relationship between religiosity and tolerance in the MENA, I
apply the three-Bs perspective—the three Bs referring to the distinction between
religious Belonging, Belief, and Behavior as different explanatory dimensions—
which has already proven to help understand the complex influence of religiosity
on other topics (Kellstedt et al. 1996; Smidt, Kellstedt, and Gudt 2009; Wald
and Wilcox 2006). It allows me to theorize the differential impact of these three
dimensions in the MENA. As such, this study assesses whether insights from the
Western-oriented literature on the religiosity–tolerance linkage are generalizable
to the MENA context, and under what conditions. Also, by considering Islamic
religiosity in a multidimensional way, this study provides an empirically
informed critique of civilizationist and Orientalist studies that present Islam as a
singularly (negative) driver of liberal political attitudes (e.g., Huntington 1996;
Norris and Inglehart 2012; Yuchtman-Yaar and Alkalay 2007).
Moreover, such Orientalist studies essentialize the MENA region to one
homogenous bloc of “Islamic countries” (cf. Spierings 2015), while there is sub-
stantial macro-level diversity in society–state–religion relations across the
MENA (e.g., Fox 2013, 2015; Owen 2004). The latter insight, however, has not
yet been translated to micro-level studies. In this study, I acknowledge and utilize
the differences amongMENA countries by actually theorizing and showing how
this diversity in society–state–religion relations shapes religiosity’s impact on
ethno-religious tolerance at the individual level (cf. Fox 2013, Chapter 6).
Empirically, this study is based on thirty-two synchronized Arab Barometer
and World Value surveys for thirteen countries, the years ranging from 2001 to
2014. Using pooled multilevel regression models, I estimate the general relation-
ships between religiosity dimensions and social tolerance. Moreover, I apply
multilevel models with cross-level interactions as well as country-disaggregated
analyses to study how these linkages between religiosity and tolerance vary by
the countries’ society–state–religion relationships.
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Theoretical Background and Expectations
Ethno-Religious Social Tolerance
The literature on the relationship between people’s religion and ethno-religious
tolerance lies at the crossroads of the more sociological literature on ethnocen-
trism and prejudice (e.g., Allport and Ross 1967; Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Hello
2002; Steiber 1980; Strabac and Listhaug 2008) and the more political-science-
oriented literature on tolerance (e.g., Bloom and Arikan 2012; Bloom and
Bagno-Moldavsky 2015; Gibson 1992). The first literature generally focuses on
people’s attitudes regarding ethno-religious out-groups, whereas the latter de-
fines social tolerance as “the preparedness to co-exist [and] the willingness to
maintain personal contact with the member of the disliked group, such as by
having him or her as a neighbor” (Bloom and Bagno-Moldavsky 2015, 626; see
also Gibson 1992). Located exactly at this crossroads, ethno-religious social tol-
erance can thus be defined as follows: the willingness to co-exist in the locale
with people who have a different ethno-religious background from oneself.
Ethno-religious social tolerance is an important positive explanatory factor of
people’s support for democracy in the MENA region (Ciftci 2010; Rizzo, Abdel-
Latif, and Meyer 2007); however, hardly any MENA study has tried to explain
individual-level tolerance (cf. Al Sadi and Basit 2013). Here, I do so by building
on the three-Bs multidimensional concept of religiosity (Bloom and Arikan
2012; Kellstedt et al. 1996) combined with social-identity theory (see Al Sadi
and Basit 2013; Brown 2000; Tajfel 1981) and socialization theory (see
Camilleri and Malewska-Peyre 1997).
Belonging, Belief, and Behavior
Religiosity is a container concept harboring a multitude of related but distin-
guishable dimensions (Fox 2013; González 2011; Hassan 2007; Moaddel 2006;
Moaddel and Karabenick 2008; Stark and Glock 1968). These dimensions have
each been shown to have different relationships with tolerance in established
Western democracies (e.g., Bloom and Arikan 2012; Eisenstein 2006; Kellstedt
et al. 1996) and with other attitudes in the Middle East (Kucinskas 2010;
Kucinskas and Van der Does 2017; Spierings 2014; Tessler 2002). The distinc-
tion between belonging, belief, and behavior has proven particularly useful in
theorizing these different influences (Leege and Kellstedt 1993; Smidt, Kellstedt,
and Gudt 2009; Wald and Wilcox 2006) and is here applied to the MENA con-
text. First, I will discuss insights from the existing Western literature per “B.” In
the next section after, I will then bring in the MENA context and formulate
(context-specific) hypotheses.
Belonging refers to whether people consider themselves religious, particularly
to what extent religion is part of their social identity (Bloom, Arikan, and
Courtemanche 2015; Gibson 2006; Kellstedt et al. 1996). This identification
leads to intergroup tensions as a positive view of the in-group is brought
about by contrasting it with out-groups. Consequently, stronger or more acti-
vated in-group identification is often related to feeling threatened by other
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ethno-religious groups and intolerant views becoming more likely (Bloom,
Arikan, and Courtemanche 2015; Djupe and Calfano 2013; Scheepers, Gijsberts,
and Hello 2002; Wilcox and Jelen 1990). This negative relationship has been
widely confirmed in the literature, particularly among majority group members;
studies that seemingly show otherwise either collapse “belonging” with other
dimensions of religiosity or do not control for those (e.g., Eisenstein 2006;
Verkuyten et al. 2014).
Belief refers to people’s understanding of their religion. The tolerance litera-
ture shows that people’s understanding often revolves around compassion, argu-
ing that all the so-called Religions of the Book have benevolence at their core, as
well as a common understanding that their god created all people and holds final
judgment. So it is often suggested that the more a person believes in the literal
interpretation of scripture, the less individualistic that believer is and the more
likely to think in terms of helping others. Starks and Robinson (2009, 652), for
instance, discuss this in terms of moral cosmology, whereby believing in god as
the ultimate basis of moral rule and considering scripture as the word of god is
linked to a form of communitarianism whereby one’s neighbors and the eco-
nomically worse off are considered part of one’s community.
The main caveat here is that this expected benevolence is generally only
directed towards the broadly defined ethno-religious in-group (Bloom, Arikan,
and Courtemanche 2015; Djupe and Calfano 2013; Norenzayan 2014;
Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Hello 2002). People who believe in literalist interpreta-
tions of scripture are generally religiously more extreme and are likely to see
their religion as the only true one. Consequently, they are said to have increased
negative orientations towards out-groups, and thus scriptural literalism often re-
lates negatively to ethno-religious tolerance (see Eisenstein 2006; Scheepers,
Gijsberts, and Hello 2002).
Behavior is arguably given the least attention in the tolerance literature, partly
because it is generally seen as an antecedent or consequence of belonging or be-
liefs (e.g., Bloom, Arikan, and Courtemanche 2015; Fox 2013). However, from
a socialization perspective, attending services should be seen as an activity that
also independently decreases tolerance (Bloom and Arikan 2012; Scheepers,
Gijsberts, and Hello 2002; cf. Eisenstein 2006; Kucinskas 2010). Attendance
can directly feed negative attitudes towards other (religious) groups, as attendees
consume and are socialized in ethno-religious exclusionist or prejudiced mes-
sages, assuming that religious services convey such messages.
Theorizing Religiosity and Tolerance in the MENA Context
Reflecting on the mechanisms formulated above from a MENA perspective draws
attention to both how society–state–religion relations in the MENA differ from
those in the West and how they vary across the MENA (Moghadam 2013; Owen
2004). I argue that these relationships are not only the product of religious strug-
gles (Fox 2015), but in themselves also shape the religious competition at the citi-
zen level (cf. Fox 2013). Moreover, building on Hassan’s discussion of religiosity
in a Muslim context (2007), I contend that the distinction among belonging, belief,
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and behavior is also relevant in the MENA, but that these dimensions might mani-
fest themselves differently in the MENA (see also González 2011).
Belonging—people’s degree of identifying as a member of a religion—is
linked to tolerance through social identification and threat perception. In the
MENA, these threat perceptions, and thus the linkage between belonging and
intolerance, can be considered more strongly activated. The region at large is
characterized by religious conflict and violence (e.g., the Arab–Israeli conflict,
the Arab Uprisings), and violence activates religious grievances towards others
(Grim and Finke 2010; Netterstrøm 2015; Spierings 2017). Moreover, it seems
likely that the negative linkage between religious belonging and ethno-religious
social tolerance is particularly strong in those countries where religious fraction-
alization is salient and actual religion-based violence a daily reality, which is not
the case in all MENA countries.
Threat perception might also be particularly salient among non-Muslim citizens in
the predominantly Muslim MENA. From studies on minority groups in the West,
we know that among minority groups, increased threat perception also translates to
ethno-religious prejudice and intolerance (Berry 1999, 2006). In the MENA, it is par-
ticularly strongly religious non-Muslims who have reason to feel threatened. For
instance, across the region, the three-fold distinction among (a) Muslim believers, (b)
Christians and Jews (also referred to as the other People of the Book, Ahl al-Kitab, or
Dhimmi), and (c) non-believers (also kafir or kufr) is regularly interpreted as a hierar-
chical one, with those ranked lower deserving fewer rights or respect (e.g., Geaves
2006). Although this hierarchical notion is theologically and societally contested (Al
Sadi and Basit 2013; Abou El Fadl 2002), it follows from this that people who
strongly oppose Islam—strongly religious non-Muslims—particularly experience
threats and grievances within this violence-ridden context (Grim & Finke 2006),
which translates to ethno-religious intolerance.
All this directs me to propose the following three hypotheses about belonging:
H1:The more a person identifies as religious, the lower the person’s
ethno-religious social tolerance.
H1a:The stronger a country’s religious fractionalization and conflict, the
stronger the negative relation between religious identification and ethno-
religious social tolerance.
H1b:Among non-Muslims, the negative relation between religious iden-
tification and ethno-religious social tolerance is stronger than among
Muslims
Regarding belief—or, more specifically, scriptural literalism—reflecting on dis-
cussions of Islamic scripture further underscores the mechanism formulated on
belief in the previous section: in short, while Zakat (almsgiving) is one of the five
pillars in (almost all) forms of Islam and prescribes believers to show compas-
sion (Geaves 2006, 121), there is a great deal of societal discussion on what the
Qur’an and Hadith say about compassion towards non-Muslims. It is not
uncommon to find a position that only showing compassion towards in-groups
is legitimate. Given the focus on ethno-religious tolerance here, it is therefore
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likely that people holding more scripturally literalist beliefs have lower levels of
ethno-religious social tolerance.
However, this relationship should also be seen in light of the different posi-
tions more orthodox or scripturally literalist groups take across the MENA.
Though some MENA governments are themselves orthodox, just as many
MENA governments have at times repressed orthodox movements or interpreta-
tions of Islam (e.g., Grim and Finke 2010). Both Ben Ali’s Tunisia and
Mubarak’s Egypt, for example, banned social and political expressions of reli-
gion, and Saddam Hussein negatively interfered with the Hajj (pilgrimage to
Mecca and Medina) in Iraq (El-Ghobashy 2005; Owen 2004). Building on
social-identity theory, such threats to more orthodox people are expected to acti-
vate their orthodox identity and feed into intolerance. As Grim and Finke put it,
intolerance can be considered “the price of freedom denied” (2010, 10).
At the same time, from a belief-centered approach, others have theorized that
repression might actually increase tolerance (cf. Djupe and Calfano 2013;
Meyer, Rizzo, and Ali 2007; Spierings 2014). At the core of this argument is the
notion of “Do not do unto others what you would not have them do unto you.”
While not literally written in Islamic scripture, analogous Shura include 24:22
and 83:1–6. Scripturally literalist believers experiencing discrimination can par-
ticularly be expected to fall back on this, leading to contradictory expectations
regarding the contextual moderation (H2a1 vs. H2a2).
To summarize the expectations on beliefs:
H2:The more people are scriptural literalists, the lower their ethno-
religious social tolerance.
H2a1:If orthodox Islam is repressed in a country, scriptural literalism
has a stronger negative relationship with ethno-religious social tolerance
than if orthodox Islam is not repressed in a country.
H2a2:If orthodox Islam is repressed in a country, scriptural literalism is
positively related to ethno-religious social tolerance.
Regarding the dimension of behavior, it is crucial to understand that attendance
of services is considered a social activity in the MENA, strongly subject to the
customs of one’s direct environment (e.g., Hassan 2007, 442). Mosque atten-
dance should thus not be too quickly interpreted as a purely religious act or a
statement of support for the preached messages. This makes it even more likely
that attendance has an independent effect on tolerance, as discussed above.
At the same time, we should acknowledge that the messages preached by
clergy (e.g., imams) differ strongly in the degree to which they denounce other
religions. As Al Sadi and Basit (2013) showed for Oman, the actual message
communicated by figures of authority matters in shaping children’s ethno-
religious social tolerance. Translating this to the diversity of the MENA draws
attention to how strongly an exclusionary conservative form of Islam is
engrained in the state structure and in the extent to which MENA governments
regulate religious matters (e.g., Cesari 2014; Fox 2015). In Saudi Arabia, for
instance, the government enforces a very intolerant form of Islam (Salafi or
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Wahhabi Islam) and runs the central council of clerics that issue the fatwas im-
ams communicate during their services (see Boucek 2010). Similar situations are
found in Algeria, Bahrain, and Yemen (for full details see the operationalization
of the contextual variables below and Appendix C2). If this combination of
exclusionist state Islam and strict religious regulation is present, I will speak of a
“hegemonic Islamic state,” and, in such states, mosque attendance is expected to
foster intolerance most (see also Moaddel and Karabenick 2008).
The hypotheses on behavior thus read as follows:
H3:Communal attendance is negatively related to ethno-religious social
tolerance.
H3a:If a country is a hegemonic Islamic state, attendance has a stronger
negative relationship with ethno-religious social tolerance than when it
is not a hegemonic Islamic state.
Data and Method
Data Sources and Models
For this study, I combined all thirty-two Arab-country World Value and Arab
Barometer surveys that include items for each of the core theoretical concept (AB
2006-2014; WVS 1981–2014). These nationally representative surveys represent
13 countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco,
Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen. All data were collected
between 2001 and 2014. See Appendix A for detailed information per survey.
Random-intercept multilevel models with survey and country as higher levels
were estimated. These pooled multilevel models prevent any false positive con-
clusions on the micro-level effects due to correlated errors. The hypotheses on
the context-dependency of the individual-level relationships are tested with
cross-level interaction terms. These models are estimated using random slopes
for the religiosity dimensions in order to avoid false positives on the interaction
terms. In addition, I estimated standard OLS-regression models per country
(table 2). These models help to assess the internal generalizability of the pooled
models (see Spierings 2016) and determine whether different effects across con-
texts really indicate context-dependency or are due to different surveys or out-
liers being included (see below). This dual approach allows me to transcend
current practices in the MENA public-opinion literature, which is dominated by
(a) single-country studies in which the external generalizability of the results can-
not be assessed and (b) pooled “civilizationist” studies comparing the MENA to
the West that ignore the internal diversity of the region (see Davis and Robinson
2006, 167; Spierings 2015, Chapter 2).
Combining Surveys
For the comparative analyses, the surveys were synchronized: all include items
per theoretical concept, but not all items or wordings are exactly the same.
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Building on the logic at the core of comparing the impact of different variables
within one regression model—z-value based standardized scores (the Beta coeffi-
cients)—I use intra-survey standardized scores for different items that tap the
same concept. Doing so, I create variables that can be used to compare the direc-
tion of effects across surveys. After standardizing values per item and survey, the
average z-value per respondent was calculated for all items available for that
respondent.1 Items have only been combined when they relate to the same con-
cept, that is, when the questions were very similar but with different answering
categories (such as on attendance) or when different items can theoretically be
considered part of the same concept and also load on one underlying factor
(e.g., tolerance).
The advantages of such a large-scale comparative approach evidently do
come at a cost. Different understandings on concepts, item availability, and is-
sues of translation might lead to different results across countries. By using rela-
tive intra-country scores and performing several robustness testt, I, however,
minimalized and assessed the likelihood of this driving the outcomes. More de-
tails are provided below. Moreover, the breadth of this study limits its depth,
particularly when it comes to introducing more detail on some of the religiosity
dimensions. I return to this in the conclusion.
The robustness tests include (a) the models being estimated with other opera-
tionalizations of the dependent variable (see below); the core model being esti-
mated (b) on subsamples, such as only Muslim respondents; (c) with income as
an additional control variable (see below); and (d) with an additional operatio-
nalization of beliefs, only available for a few surveys (see below). The outcomes
of these robustness tests are provided in Appendix D1 and discussed in the
Results section. Unless mentioned otherwise, the results are robust. In table 1, I
present the models with the largest sample of surveys and respondents.
Ethno-Religious Social Tolerance
Based on the existing literature, I defined ethno-religious social tolerance as the
willingness to co-exist in the locale with people who have a different ethno-
religious background from oneself. Given this definition, the common operatio-
nalization of tolerance in studies on non-Western countries also seems suitable
here: whether people would accept or object to having neighbors of a different
race, color, or ethnicity, or with a migration background (see also Ciftci 2010;
Dixon 2008; Rizzo, Abdel-Latif, and Meyer 2007; Spierings 2014). Moreover,
all thirty-two datasets include two or more items from the following list of
groups to which someone might object: ethnicity, religion, race, or migration
background (see Appendix B1). Reliability tests and factor analyses on these
items show that the items form a valid and reliable scale.2 Crucially, for all sur-
veys, the items includes ones that refer to religion and ethnicity in general terms,
not naming specific groups (e.g., non-Muslims or Christians). Thus, the toler-
ance measurement includes intolerance towards people identifying with other
ethno-religious subgroups within Islam. I synchronized the data across surveys
as discussed above, also taking into account, for instance, that people tend to
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object slightly less to living next to a person of a different race than of a different
religion. A higher score on the final variable indicates more tolerant attitudes.
Additionally, I used the neighbor items to construct a second dependent vari-
able as a robustness test: the simple additive score on the two items on neighbors
of a different religion and race. These two items are available in most surveys,
but only using them still leads to the loss of six datasets and about ten thousand
respondents. While this alternative measures the same theoretical concept, other
forms of (ethno-religious) tolerance of course exist as well.
First, the focus of this study is on social tolerance; political tolerance (i.e., ex-
tending political right to (least-liked) groups) falls beyond its scope. For political
tolerance, different mechanisms can be expected (see Djupe & Calfano 2013;
Eisenstein 2006; Sullivan & Transue 1999), and none of the thirty-two surveys
includes items on the political rights of members of other religious groups, which
makes it impossible to make a direct comparison in this study.
Second, I focus on social tolerance in the broader sense here—co-existing as
neighbors—whereas more specific and close-by forms of co-existence can be
worth considering too. Five surveys also include the item “to what extent do
you consider the following factors obstacles to accepting your son/daughter/sis-
ter/brother’s marriage?,” including “race,” “religion or denomination,” and
“nationality.” I have also estimated the direct-effects model on these five surveys
using this alternative dependent variable (see column F in Appendix D1). These
results are included in the discussion of the results below.
Dimensions of Religiosity3
The degree of religious identification (belonging) is measured through three
items of which all surveys include at least one: To what extent do you consider
yourself religious (not, somewhat, religious); Are you a religious person? (no,
including atheists; yes); How important is religion in your life? (0–3). In multiple
WVS surveys, the last two items are both included, and a factor analysis shows
that they load on one singular dimension. Although these items do not tap into
social identification directly, they do indicate to what extent people’s religion is
a salient part of their identity (cf. González 2011; Spierings 2014). The final vari-
able is calculated using the synchronization procedure discussed above. A higher
score indicates stronger religious identification. Appendix B2 presents the items
included per survey.
To assess belonging’s differential impact among members of minority and
majority religious groups (H1b), denomination could be included as a dichoto-
mous variable indicating whether a respondent is Muslim or not. Algeria 2006,
Morocco 2006, and Yemen 2011 include no information on denomination, but
in those countries, 98–100 percent of the population is Muslim. Moreover, these
countries’ surveys from other years only include fifteen non-Muslims out of over
10,000 respondents. For these three country-year points, I assume all respon-
dents are Muslim. Such an assumption could not be made for two other surveys
without information on denomination, so they were excluded.4
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Scriptural literalism (beliefs) is measured in each survey through people’s
views on a set of acts that are by and large considered haram and literally noted
as such in Islamic scripture. The more a respondent thinks these things are not
justified, the more they take a scripturally literalist position. The surveys’ issues
include suicide, alcohol, euthanasia, charging interest, divorce, and participation
in a lottery (see Appendix B2). On the synchronized index, a higher score indi-
cates a more literalist or orthodox position. While the items on interest, alcohol,
and lotteries are particular to Islamic scripture, the others are not. The disaggre-
gated analyses, however, show that the effects for scriptural literalism do not
systematical differ between countries for which the more general issues are avail-
able and those for which the more Islam-oriented ones are.
For sixteen WVS surveys, an indicator was available that taps into the con-
cept of moral cosmology—whether respondents consider god or the individual
to be the ultimate basis of moral rule—which is part of the mechanism theorized
above. On a 10-point scale, people could indicate whether they consider god to
be important in their life (1 = not at all; 10 = very). This variable is used in an
additional robustness test (see Appendix D1).
Last, attendance of communal services (behavior) was included across surveys
in a similar way through items on how regularly a respondent attends Friday
prayer (or Sunday service) or whether the respondent prays in church or mos-
que, and how often (see Appendix B2). A higher synchronized score indicates
that a respondent attends communal services more than the other respondents in
that country and year. As Brenner (2013) shows that women in Muslim coun-
tries tend to over-report attendance more than men, the impact of attendance is
also estimated for women and men separately as an additional robustness test.
Micro-Level Control Variables
To control for confounding effects, core explanatory variables from the litera-
ture are included (see Bloom and Arikan 2012; Moaddel 2002; Scheepers,
Gijsberts, and Hello 2002; Spierings 2014; Tessler 2002): employment status,
education, sex, age,5 age squared (capturing curvilinear effects), and marital sta-
tus. Respondents’ household income is only added in robustness analyses, as it
has a large number of missing values across surveys: 4,563. Income is a synchro-
nized score based on ten-point variables that use somewhat different metrics
across the surveys. Descriptive information on all micro-level variables is pro-
vided in Appendix C1.
Contextual Variables
The macro-level scores are obtained from existing data sets and studies, or coded
specifically for this study. An overview of all scores is given in Appendix C2.
The degree of religious fractionalization and violence (H1a) was measured by
two variables. The first is the degree of religious fractionalization as provided by
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Alesina and colleagues at the country level, which is measured in demographic
terms and thus fairly stable over a period of at most fourteen years (2003, 7).
The second is the level of religion-based violence in society. For this variable, I
used multiple indicators from the Global Restrictions on Religion Data (GRRD
[ARDA 2017]), which covers 2007 onwards, and the International Religious
Freedom data (IRF [ARDA 2018]), which covers 2001 through 2008. From
these datasets, I used the specific items that focus on the prevalence of actual vio-
lence against religious groups or religious-based violence, which is at the core of
the theoretical mechanism. As also argued for by others, the measurement
focuses on the actual situation and goes beyond state efforts and actions by
including violence from other actors too (see Fox 2015, 6; Grim and Finke
2010, 10). Both the GRRD and the IRF include items on violence, but not
exactly the same ones. Consequently, I estimated three differently models. The
first including a newly created index based on an average of the year of the sur-
vey and the year before (if available), averaging, respectively, seventeen (GRRD)
and fifteen (IRF) items,6 all coded to run from 0 to 1. For the second and the
third, I estimated the interaction models with the country-average GRRD and
IRF scores, because the country-year scores (see Appendix C2) mainly differ
between countries (not between years within countries), and differences between
the GRRD and the IRF might influence results. The third model is included in
table 1, but the two other models lead to exactly the same conclusion, as dis-
cussed below.
The impact of scriptural literalism was argued to vary by the state repression
of orthodox Islam (H2a1, H2a2). For this, I created a new indicator, as existing
data does not specifically focus on orthodox Islam.7 The indicator classifies
country-years in three groups: (1) countries in which Islamic parties are for-
bidden to organize politically or where main orthodox religious groups were
deprived or repressed in society, economy, and politics, as was for instance the
case with the Muslim Brotherhood in Mubarak’s Egypt (e.g., Owen 2004)8;
(−1) countries in which Islamic actors are in power politically9; or (0) countries
in which neither was the case.
Lastly, I combined two data sources to create an indicator as to which
countries and years can be considered to reflect a hegemonic Islamic state
(HIS) (H3a): the government has control over what is preached in mosques
and the country is an Islamic and religiously exclusionary state. States that
only have one of these characteristics or, for instance, regulate religions less
strictly via funding (see Grim and Finke 2006) are not considered HIS.
Regarding the first dimension, the GRRD (see above) includes information
on whether the government has a body that regulates or manages religious af-
fairs. I use the score of the closest available years for the missing years (2014
and the earliest surveys). Only a score indicating strict and coercive regula-
tion was considered as sufficient for scoring a yes on this element (see Fox
2015; Grim and Finke 2006). Next, to measure the extent to which a state
is exclusionary Islamic, I used the Islamism indicator based on countries’
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constitutions introduced in Spierings, Smits, and Verloo (2009) and updated
in Spierings (2015).10 As Cesari (2014, 31) notes “References to Islam in a
state’s constitution often reinforce the negation or minimization of religious
and/or ethnic diversity”.11 A state is considered exclusionary Islamic if a
country meets three out of four of the following criteria: there is no institu-
tional religious freedom; the state is labeled Islamic; laws are Shari’a-based;
and only a Muslim can become head of state. Overall, six country-years are
considered hegemonic Islamic states, as they score yes on both elements (see
Appendix C2). All these six are found in the later years, which is in line with
Fox’s general observation that states are becoming more involved in religion,
which he also predicted for the Arab Spring’s aftermath (2015).
Results
Table 1 presents the pooled micro-level models (Model 1), the micro-level inter-
actions (H1b) (Model 2), as well as the cross-level interaction models (Models
3–5). The latter models are estimated with a random slope. The p-values of reli-
giosity’s micro-level direct effects are, therefore, overestimated, but not the
cross-level interaction terms, which are the reason for estimating these models.
To further assess the cross-level interaction effects’ validity, (a) the country-
disaggregated models (table 2) are included in the interpretations, and (b) the
country-year disaggregated coefficients are plotted against the context-variable
scores (figures 1–3). Similarly, in my discussion of the results, I include the out-
comes of the robustness tests (e.g., Appendix D1). Overall, the models seem
valid, as the control variables’ results are in line with previous work: particularly
education relates positively and strongly to tolerance (see e.g., Scheepers,
Gijsberts, and Hello 2002; Spierings 2014). I will now discuss the results per
dimension of religiosity.
Figure 1. Context-dependent impact of religious identification (each marker represents a
survey).
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Table 1. Multilevel regression models estimating the impact of religiosity on ethno-religious tolerance
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Direct effects
Individual-level
interaction (H1b)
Cross-level interaction with
Belonging
Scriptural
literalism Attendance
Fixed effects
Intercept −0.1407*** −0.1397*** −0.1282** −0.1431*** −0.1443***
Religion
Belonging −0.0088* −0.0090* 0.0044 −0.0086* −0.0084
*Non-Muslim −0.0006
Non-Muslim (ref =Muslim) (main effect) −0.0491**
*Religious fractionalization (context) −0.0122
*Religious-based violence (context) −0.0342
Scriptural literalism 0.0124** 0.0118** 0.0134** 0.0063 0.0127**
*Orthodox Islam being oppressed (context) −0.0385*
Attendance −0.0224*** −0.0221*** −0.0228*** −0.0212*** −0.0144
*Hegemonic Islamic State (context) −0.0660*
Controls
Employment (ref = employed)
Retired −0.0226 −0.0239 −0.0241 −0.0237 −0.0237
Housewife −0.0176 −0.0179 −0.0201 −0.0210 −0.0165
Student 0.0141 0.0140 0.0143 0.0120 0.0165
(Continued)
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Table 1. continued
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Direct effects
Individual-level
interaction (H1b)
Cross-level interaction with
Belonging
Scriptural
literalism Attendance
Not employed other −0.0045 −0.0053 −0.0062 −0.0070 −0.0009
Education (ref = no)
Primary completed 0.0747*** 0.0753*** 0.0772*** 0.0742*** 0.0772***
Secondary completed 0.1171*** 0.1179*** 0.1199*** 0.1196*** 0.1204***
At least some tertiary 0.1811*** 0.1820*** 0.1833*** 0.1831*** 0.1855***
Sex (Ref = male) −0.0093 −0.0088 −0.0075 −0.0080 −0.0148
Age (0–7) 0.0266** 0.0272** 0.0275** 0.0275** 0.0270**
Age squared −0.0005 −0.0005 −0.0006 −0.0006 −0.0005
Marital status (ref = married)
Single 0.0361** 0.0369* 0.0360** 0.0378** 0.0365**
Other (incl. divorced, widowed) 0.0243 0.0241 0.0245 0.0243 0.0244
Contextual factors
Religious fractionalization (country) −0.0425
Religious-based violence (country) −0.0127
Orthodox Islam being suppressed (country year) 0.0016
Hegemonic Islamic State (country year) 0.0137
Random effects
Survey level
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Intercept 0.000000 0.000000 0.000037 0.000153 0.000000
Belonging
Scriptural literalism 0.003807**
Attendance 0.002741**
Country level
Intercept 0.000514 0.000417 0.000568 0.000593 0.000530
Belonging 0.002082
Scriptural literalism
Attendance
Model statistics
BIC 86,091.016 86,096.651 85,957.743 86,025.926 85,982.456
Nind 38,907 38,907 38,907 38,907 38,907
Nsrvy 32 32 32 32 32
Nctry 13 13 13 13 13
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05. Data source: AB and WVS surveys; GRRD data; Alesina et al. (2003), Spierings, Smits, and Verloo (2009), Spierings
(2015), and own codings.
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Belonging: Religious Identification
Model 1 suggests that people in the MENA who identify more strongly as reli-
gious are on average somewhat less tolerant towards other ethno-religious
groups, but this difference is neither statistically significant (p < .05) across mod-
els, nor found consistently across the countries (table 2) or alternative models
(Appendix D1). Also, belonging does not turn consistently significant if atten-
dance, as a possible mediator, is left out of the model. Regarding H1b, Model 2
gives no clear indication that the effect is considerably stronger among Muslim
citizens.12 In short, no clear unitary effect on tolerance is found for religious
identification.
It should be noted, while not at the core of this study, that Model 2 shows
non-Muslim citizens to be on average less ethno-religiously tolerant than
Muslim citizens (see also Rizzo, Abdel-Latif, and Meyer 2007, 1156). This goes
against the civilizationist literature that suggests that non-Muslims are generally
more tolerant (Fish 2011; Inglehart and Norris 2003). The results here lend sup-
port to the idea that it is not one’s denomination, but one’s status as a religious
minority that leads people to be less socially tolerant towards people of other re-
ligions (i.e., the religious majority) (see Spierings 2014; Verkuyten et al. 2014).
Regarding the context-dependent effect of religious belonging, Model 3 shows
that the variance in the relationship is not significantly related to a country’s reli-
gious fractionalization or its degree of violence: the interaction coefficients are
Table 2. Impact of religious belonging, scriptural literalism, and attendance on ethno-
religious social tolerance in thirteen MENA countries
Belonging Scriptural literalism Attendance
Algeria (3,811) 0.082*** 0.002 −0.080***
Bahrain (340) −0.038 −0.176** 0.037
Egypt (4,032) −0.003 0.031# −0.018
Iraq (6,422) 0.004 0.010 −0.012
Jordan (4330) −0.002 0.017 −0.010
Lebanon (3085) 0.031* −0.013 −0.039**
Libya (1712) 0.009 0.010 0.035*
Morocco (3290) 0.038* 0.020 −0.007
Palestine (1934) −0.104*** 0.048* 0.019
Saudi Arabia (2236) −0.079*** 0.061** −0.048**
Sudan (1270) −0.060** −0.044* −0.045*
Tunisia (2253) −0.044* 0.035# −0.002
Yemen (4546) 0.016 0.055** −0.062**
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; #p < 0.10.
All models are controlled for employment status, education, marital status, sex, and age.
Bold = the same direction as relationship in pooled analyses (table 1, Model 1).
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not statistically significant (refuting H1a), and these relationships also remain
far from statistically significant using the alternative operationalizations.13 The
disaggregated results (table 2), however, do suggest another pattern: all statisti-
cally negative relationships are found in countries that were ruled by Islamist
political actors at the time (see Appendix C2). Figure 1 plots this against the dis-
aggregated coefficients of belonging, and a rather clear pattern surfaces14: in
countries not ruled by Islamists, the impact of belonging centers around zero; in
the countries where Islamists were in power (Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Sudan,
Yemen, and Tunisia in 2011), those who identify as religious strongly tend to
have lower ethno-religious social tolerance. If anything, this shows that state
structures matter in translating individual-level religiosity to (in)tolerance. As I
discuss more elaborately in the conclusion, it might be that Islamist rule legiti-
mizes intolerance, but it might equally be the case that Islamist regimes cause the
less religious in particular to become more tolerant.
To summarize, there is no clear general negative impact of religious belonging
on ethno-religious social tolerance, but in countries where Islamist are in politi-
cal power, people who more strongly identify as religious tend to be less
tolerant.
Belief: Scriptural Literalism
Table 1 shows a rather stable and positive relationship between scriptural literal-
ism and social tolerance: the more orthodox people are, the more tolerant (refut-
ing H2).15 The robustness tests largely confirm this relationship, with the
alternative operationalization of orthodox beliefs—moral cosmology: the impor-
tance of god—for instance also showing a significant positive effect (Appendix
D1). Also, running the models without attendance—which might actually
obscure a negative effect of literalism on tolerance through attendance—shows a
similarly strong and significant positive impact of scriptural literalism. The addi-
tional models (Appendix D1), however, do suggest that the positive effect of
scriptural literalism does not extend from tolerance towards neighbors to toler-
ance towards the closest personal sphere (i.e., in-law children and siblings), at
least not for the five country-years for which these data were available.
In terms of context-dependency, the effect of scriptural literalism on ethno-
religious social tolerance is separately reproduced for the majority of countries
(table 2): in ten of the thirteen countries, corresponding positive coefficients are
found, and in five, the coefficients and sample are large enough for the relation-
ship to reach statistical significance. At the same time, the positive effects varied
in strength and three negative effects were found, two of which being statically
significant.
Model 4 and figure 2 provide strong support for the idea that the impact of
scriptural literalism is strongly negative if orthodox Muslims are repressed (sup-
porting H2a1; refuting H2a2). Model 4 shows a positive main effect of scrip-
tural literalism on tolerance in countries in which orthodox Muslim are in
power or not suppressed, but a very strong negative effect if they are suppressed.
This significant negative interaction effect is also reproduced in models with the
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alternative dependent variable and in both the Muslim and non-Muslim samples
(Appendix D1). The disaggregating analyses indeed show that the negative effect
is strongly present for Bahrain, where the religious Shi’a majority feels sup-
pressed by the Sunni royal family. But also in Lebanon (2013), where Sunnis
were politically intimidated in 2012/2013, a statistically negative effect was
found, and for Morocco—where Islamist parties are forbidden to run for elec-
tions—the positive effect was absent across surveys.
Summarizing, under adverse conditions, the more orthodox turn less tolerant,
but under “normal” circumstances more orthodox people are on average more
tolerant towards people with other ethno-religious background in their neigh-
borhood (but not in their family).16
Behavior: Attendance
Lastly, communal attendance has a clear and robust negative relationship with
ethno-religious social tolerance in all models.17 Moreover, the effect is repro-
duced in ten of the thirteen countries and reached statistical significance in five
(table 2). Nevertheless, the impact differs by context.
Model 5 and figure 3 show that the negative effect is far stronger in hege-
monic Islamic states than in countries and years in which Islamic states did not
coercively regulate religious messages (confirming H3a). In figure 3, all very
strong negative effects are indeed found in hegemonic Islamic states such as
Saudi Arabia (2011) and Yemen (2014), in which central government bodies
enforce and regulate a conservative and intolerant interpretation of Islam. In
Saudi Arabia, for instance, Wahhabi clerics are highly represented in the reli-
gious hierarchy of the state, which controls the content of sermons, and the
grand mufti and others do not shy away from preaching about enemies of Islam
(Boucek 2010; Gause 2014, 8). Attendees in these countries are particularly
exposed to and socialized in such intolerant messages.
Figure 2. Context-dependent impact of scriptural literalism (each marker represents a
survey).
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The insignificant main effect of attendance in Model 5 might suggest that the
negative effect is absent in the other countries; however, the overall effect among
the countries not coded as hegemonic Islamic states remains negative and is sta-
tistically significant (p < .01) in an interaction model without random slopes.
This general negative effect can also be derived from figure 3, in which most
cases on the left-hand side (nineteen of twenty-six) are found below zero.
Thus, the more people attend religious services, the more likely they are to
object to living next to people with different ethno-religious backgrounds, and
this effect is stronger in hegemonic Islamic states.
Conclusion
The relationship between individual-level religiosity and social ethno-religious
tolerance has hardly gotten any attention in the public-opinion literature on the
MENA, although many pundits and Orientalist studies tend to equate Islam to
intolerance (e.g., Huntington 1996; Norris and Inglehart 2012; Yuchtman-Yaar
and Alkalay 2007). As the lack of details and nuance can lead to grave miscon-
ceptions and lead to overlooking important avenues for societal change for the
better, this study set out to provide a systematic understanding of this relation-
ship. I did so starting from the three-Bs approach (e.g., Kellstedt et al. 1996;
Leege and Kellstedt 1993), which provides a general understanding of how reli-
giosity has multiple interrelated dimensions. Applying this perspective to the
MENA is pivotal, as on the one hand, it helps unpack the complex impact of
religiosity on tolerance (unlike the essentializing above-mentioned civilizationist
studies), and it, on the other hand, provides a better understanding of how con-
textual differences—between and within regions in the world—shape the impact
of individual-level religiosity. Regarding this context, this study focused particu-
larly on society–state–religion relationships. Others have shown that these differ
substantially, also within the MENA (Davis and Robinson 2006, 167; Fox
2013, 2015; Owen 2004), but we know little about how those differences influ-
ence the impact of people’s religiosity.
Figure 3. Context-dependent impact of religious attendance (each marker represents a
survey).
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Moving on to the results, first, the impact of the degree of belonging is largely
absent overall, and not particularly negative among Muslims or in societies char-
acterized by religious fractionalization and violence, as was expected based on
the Western literature (cf. Bloom, Arikan, and Courtemanche 2015; Djupe and
Calfano 2013; Hutchison and Gibler 2007; Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Hello
2002; Wilcox and Jelen 1990). However, non-Muslim minority-group members
are particularly less tolerant, which might reflect grievances stemming from vio-
lence and threat perception (see also Grim and Finke 2006). Moreover, the
analyses show that where Islamists rule, religious belonging seems more likely to
lead to intolerance (among majority population members). This does not, how-
ever, mean that Islamic rule leads the more religious to become more intolerant.
This finding might also reflect that in countries that prescribe and enforce certain
religions, religion is generally seen as being less part of the self (see Elliott and
Hayward 2009; Moaddel 2006). In other words, it might be that in the most
Islamist countries, people become less attached to their religion and thus more
tolerant. While the latter explanation seems more likely, given the overall results,
only future research can shed more definite light on this.
Second, the impact of scriptural literalism was rather consistently positive
when it comes to peoples’ neighbors, and did not depend on in-group and out-
group orientation. This finding goes against some of the Western literature
highlighting this mechanism as only reserved for in-groups (cf. Djupe and
Calfano 2013; Norenzayan 2014; Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Hello 2002), and it
might provide important tools for fostering tolerance towards other religious
groups by actually appealing to orthodox people’s religious beliefs. Muslims
who attach more value to living by the rules of the Qur’an and Hadith and the
moral authority of God seem to leave judgment to Allah, which confirms Starks
and Robinson’s (2009, 652) American-based reasoning regarding a more com-
munitarian attitude among the orthodox when it comes to feeling connected
with one’s neighbors.
Still, the analyses also show that this positive relationship turns negative in
places and times where certain religious groups are suppressed or under threat.
Again, threat perceptions—this time among more orthodox groups—provide an
explanation for this effect. An important (policy) implication of this finding ex-
tends to Europe, as it also explains why different effects are found for the impact
of orthodoxy on ethno-religious tolerance among Muslims in European coun-
tries and Muslims in MENA countries (cf. Dixon 2008; Fish 2011; Verkuyten
et al. 2014): orthodox Muslims are a minority in the former, while generally a
unrepressed majority in the latter. Summarizing, under “normal” circumstances
more scriptural–orthodox people are on average more tolerant, but this effect is
reversed if they feel repressed and threatened.
Third, religious socialization through communal attendance has an overall
negative effect on tolerance (see also Bloom and Arikan 2012; Scheepers,
Gijsberts, and Hello 2002), and the socialization mechanism is further supported
by the finding that the effect is particularly strong in hegemonic Islamic states.
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At the same time, we do not know exactly what is preached in mosques.
Although this study and other projects provide us with important comparative
context-level data (e.g., Fox 2015; Grim and Finke 2006), information on mos-
que regulation is relatively crude and limited to the country level. This is cer-
tainly a challenge for future research. Nevertheless, it seems safe to conclude
that the more people attend religious services, the less tolerant they are, particu-
larly in hegemonic Islamic states.
All in all, a combination of identity-based threats, socialization, and following
scriptural rules links people’s multifaceted religiosity to their social tolerance
towards people from other ethno-religious groups. The three-Bs approach
proved valuable in understanding this multifaceted, and not just negative,
impact of religiosity on tolerance towards neighbors with a different ethno-
religious background. This is important as the concept of tolerance used here
has, for instance, been shown to be important for sustainable democracy (see
Ciftci 2010; Rizzo, Abdel-Latif, and Meyer 2007; Sarkissian 2012; Tessler
2002). At the same time, it needs to be noted that this is just one type of toler-
ance; for others, religiosity’s impact might differ. When considering people’s
objection towards their child, brother, or sister marrying a person with a differ-
ent ethno-religious background, for instance, the effect of scriptural literalism
was found to be reversed. The mechanism of compassion and communitarian-
ism seems to be weaker when it comes to the most intimate social sphere. This
could, however, only be studied for five of the thirty-two surveys; more research
on other dimensions of tolerance along the lines of this study seems valuable.
Finally and more generally, this study showed the importance of conditioning
clauses to understand how the mechanisms linking religiosity to tolerance mani-
fest differently in different contexts. This is crucial for implementing effective
policy interventions. The conditioning factors include the repression of religious
groups and the threat to religious minorities, as well as governments controlling
mosque sermons. Such conditioning clauses can also be applied to the study of
religiosity and tolerance in Western countries. For instance, we should be very
careful not to take an Orientalist approach and ascribe any differences in toler-
ance across denominational groups (e.g., Muslims and Christians) to the content
of these religions. Contrasting the results of this study with the existing literature
suggests that is actually the status of a denominational group as a minority/
majority and being stigmatized or repressed that is crucial, not anything suppos-
edly intrinsic to a denomination.
Notes
1. Due to this procedure also being applied to the dependent variable, I cannot assess
the direct impact of country-level factors or compare results with macro-level studies’
(e.g. Grim and Finke 2006, 2010; Fox 2015). For cross-level interactions, equalized
averages are not problematic.
2. Cronbach’s alphas on the most prevalent sets of items are above 0.6: (1) other race,
religion, language, and migrant background 0.718; (2) other race, religion, migrant
background, and refugees 0.771; (3) other race, religion, and migrant background
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0.650. Each set of indicators load on one dimension, with loadings above 0.7, bar-
ring one exception (0.69).
3. The three dimensions of religiosity are related in a statistically significant way, but
the correlation coefficients are 0.122 or lower. Substantively, less religious people
(belonging) and people who interpret religious sources more freely (scriptural literal-
ism) also attend services frequently. Similarly, not all scriptural literalists visit the
mosque daily. Statistically, their interrelatedness does not cause statistical problems.
4. Bahrain 2014, Egypt 2012.
5. In seven categories, because for Morocco 2006 only five-year categories are avail-
able. Using age, excluding this survey, leads to similar results.
6. GRRD (17): (i) mob violence related to religion; (ii) acts of sectarian or communal
violence between religious groups; (iii) activity of religion-related terrorist groups;
(iv) extensiveness of a religion-related war or armed conflict; (v) violence resulting
from tensions between religious groups; (vi) organized groups using force or coercion
in an attempt to dominate public life with their perspective on religion; (vii) religious
groups attempting to prevent other groups to operate; (viii) use or threat of violence
to try to enforce religious norms; (ix) assaults and displacements from homes in retal-
iation for religious activities; (x) incidents of hostility over proselytizing; (xi) hostility
over conversions from one religion to another; (xii) harassment or intimidation of
religious groups by social groups motivated by religious hatred or bias; (xiii) destruc-
tion of personal or religious property motivated by religious hatred or bias; (xiv) de-
tentions or abductions motivated by religious hatred or bias; (xv) any displacement
of individuals from their homes motivated by religious hatred or bias; (xvi) physical
assaults motivated by religious hatred or bias; (xvii) deaths motivated by religious
hatred or bias.
IRF (15): According to the report: (i) Did terrorism impede religious practice? (ii) Do
people face hassles if they do not belong to the dominant religion(s) of the country?
(iii) What type of “holy sites” are in the country, e.g., shrines or places of pilgrimage?
(iv) Are people threatened by social movements or political parties, based on reli-
gion? (v) Are people put into prison based on religion? (vi) Do Government or secu-
rity authorities harass or allow harassment based on religious brand? (vii) Does the
Government (or military) confiscate, desecrate, or destroy religious sites or facilities?
(viii) Does the Government expel, exile, deport, or deny entry to people based on
their religious brand? (ix) Were there any reported abuses targeted at specific reli-
gions by terrorist organizations? (x) Are there social movements that have religious
agendas and are violent? (xi) Are tensions related to religion reported? (xii) Are reli-
gious brands harassed by members of other religious groups? (xiii) Were there cases
of vandalism towards religious properties or cemeteries by citizens? (xiv) Were there
cases of bombings or burnings of religious buildings or murders of religious persons
by citizens? (xv) Are or were there religious militias/vigilante groups or is the military
(including de facto structure) structured along religious lines?
7. The GRRD and IRF include information on political parties, but not on religious or
orthodox ones specifically.
8. Also: Bahrain, where the Shi’a majority is discriminated against (Gengler 2013);
Islamist parties being forbidden to run for elections in Morocco (Owen 2004); and
the Lebanese Sunnis being politically intimidated in 2012/2013 (BBC 2016).
9. With Hamas ruling in Gaza, the Palestinian territories are included from 2006
onwards; the others are Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia (2011), Egypt (2012), and
Yemen.
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10. For the missing years, I complemented the data based on the original coding scheme.
Moreover, Algeria’s score was corrected from 3 to 5. Algeria has no explicit freedom
of religion, the head of state must be Muslim, un-Islamic practices are forbidden
(implying the importance of Shari’a), and Islam is the state religion.
11. Evidently, governmental behavior does not always reflect constitutional clauses: Fox
and Flores (2009) demonstrate that constitutions guaranteeing religious freedom are
not sufficient for governments not to discriminate against certain religions. However,
the focus here is on the opposite: a government formulating strong religious restric-
tions. On that, Fox and Flores (2009, Table 3) show that a constitutional indicator
does work: in countries with a constitution allowing discrimination, discrimination
is found.
12. Models on non-Muslim citizens show no statistically significant effect either.
13. Using the country average based on the IRF data produces an interaction term of
0.0355 (p = .722), and using the combined country-year scores shows an interaction
term of 0.0397 (p = .561). Using an alternative operationalization of fractionaliza-
tion—the maximum of religious-, ethnic-, and language-based fractionalization
(Alesina et al., 2003)—shows no statistically significant effect either.
14. Modeled, this cross-level interaction effect is statistically significant (p < .05).
15. This effect was consistent for people scoring differently on a proxy of in-group orien-
tation. Religious in-group orientation was operationalized using six items on the
extent to which religion is important in selecting and judging one’s first-degree rela-
tives (see Appendix B2). The interaction was only marginally significant and at best
indicated a variation in the degree of the positive relationship.
16. The country-disaggregated analyses also suggest that religious fractionalization mod-
erates the impact of scriptural literalness, with the effect disappearing or turning neg-
ative in the more fractionalized countries (Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, and Sudan).
Interaction models return a statistically significant result at p < .10. These results
provide further support for the underlying reasoning, as fractionalization also taps
the mechanism of threat perception.
17. This holds among Muslims and non-Muslims. Moreover, as attending mosque ser-
vices has different functions and as self-reporting for men and women differs (e.g.,
Brenner 2013; González 2011; Moaddel 2006), I also tested this relationship for
men and women separately. The coefficient for men was −0.020 (p = .001) and
−0.018 (p = .001) for women; the difference was not significant in an interaction
model (p = .776).
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Appendix
Appendix A1. Survey information
Country Year Survey organization Wave1 N N in analyses Survey weight
Algeria 2002 WVS 4 1,282 1,164 N
2006 AB 1 1,300 667 N
2011 AB 2 1,216 911 Y
2013 WVS 6 1,200 1,066 N
Bahrain 2009 AB 1 435 340 N
Egypt 2001 WVS 4 3,000 2,864 N
2011 AB 2 1,219 1,172 Y
Iraq 2004 WVS 4 2,325 2,176 N
2006 WVS 5 2,701 2,078 N
2011 AB 2 1,234 1,064 Y
2013 WVS 6 1,215 1,123 N
Jordan 2001 WVS 4 1,223 1,189 N
2006 AB 1 1,143 911 N
2010 AB 2 1,188 1,026 Y
2014 WVS 6 1,200 1,199 N
Lebanon 2007 AB 1 1,195 954 N
2011 AB 2 1,387 1,308 Y
2013 WVS 6 1,200 1,002 N
Libya 2014 WVS 6 2,131 1,751 Y
Morocco 2001 WVS 4 1,251 1,190 Y
2006 AB 1 1,277 942 N
2007 WVS 5 1,200 1,157 N
Palestine 2010 AB 2 1,200 1,053 Y
2013 WVS 6 1,000 889 N
Saudi Arabia 2003 WVS 4 1,502 1,337 N
2011 AB 2 1,404 1,068 Y
Sudan 2011 AB 2 1,538 1,245 Y
Tunisia 2011 AB 2 1,196 1,102 Y
2013 WVS 6 1,205 1,156 N
Yemen 2007 AB 1 717 514 N
2011 AB 2 1,200 886 Y
2014 WVS 6 1,000 929 N
43,484 37,413 (86%)
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Appendix B1. Items included in operationalization of tolerance
Does (not) object to mentioned type of neighbor
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Algeria 2002 X X X
Algeria 2006 X X X
Algeria 2011 X X X X
Algeria 2013 X X X X
Bahrain 2009 X X X
Egypt 2001 X X X
Egypt 2011 X X X X
Iraq 2004 X X X X X X
Iraq 2006 X X X X X X
Iraq 2011 X X X X X X
Iraq 2013 X X X X
Jordan 2001 X X X X
Jordan 2006 X X X
Jordan 2010 X X X X
Jordan 2014 X X X X
Lebanon 2007 X X X
(Continued)
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Appendix B1. continued
Does (not) object to mentioned type of neighbor
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Lebanon 2011 X X X X
Lebanon 2013 X X X X
Libya 2014 X X X X
Morocco 2001 X X
Morocco 2006 X X X
Morocco 2007 X X X X
Palestine 2010 X X X
Palestine 2013 X X X X
Saudi Arabia 2003 X X X
Saudi Arabia 2011 X X X X
Sudan 2011 X X X X
Tunisia 2011 X X X X
Tunisia 2013 X X X X
Yemen 2007 X X X
Yemen 2011 X X X X
Yemen 2014 X X X X
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Appendix
B2.
Item
s
included
in
operationalization
ofreligiosity
dim
ensions
B
elonging
Scripturalliteralism
R
eligious
in-group
orientation
A
ttendance
C o u n t r y y e a r
T o w h a t e x t e n t
d o y o u c o n s i d e r y o u r s e l f
a s r e l i g i o u s ? ( n o t , s o m e w h a t ,
r e l i g i o u s )
A r e y o u a r e l i g i o u s p e r s o n ?
( y e s , n o i n c l . c o n v i n c e d a t h e i s t )
H o w i m p o r t a n t i s
r e l i g i o n i n y o u r l i f e ? ( 0 - 3 )
D i v o r c e
S u i c i d e
D r i n k i n g a l c o h o l
E u t h a n a s i a
P a r t i c i p a t e i n a l o t t e r y
C h a r g i n g i n t e r e s t c o n t r a d i c t s I s l a m
C h a r g i n g i n t e r e s t m u s t b e F o r b i d d e n
N o t p r a y i n g i s a n o b s t a c l e
i n a c c e p t i n g t h e
m a r r i a g e o f fi r s t - d e g r e e r e l a t i v e ( 0 - 3 )
B e i n g f r o m d i f f e r e n t
r e l i g i o n / d e n o m i n a t i o n i s
o b s t a c l e i n a c c e p t i n g m a r r i a g e o f fi r s t
d e g r e e r e l a t i v e ( 0 - 3 )
I m p o r t a n t c h i l d q u a l i t i e s :
r e l i g i o u s ( n o / y e s )
I m p o r t a n t f o r c o n s i d e r i n g w h o i s a
s u i t a b l e s p o u s e f o r s o n
o r d a u g h t e r : p r a y i n g ( 0 - 3 )
I m p o r t a n t f o r c o n s i d e r i n g
w h o i s a s u i t a b l e s p o u s e f o r
s o n o r d a u g h t e r : f a s t i n g ( 0 - 3 )
M o s t i m p o r t a n t f o r
c o n s i d e r i n g w h o i s a s u i t a b l e
s p o u s e f o r s o n / d a u g h t e r
( f a s t i n g o r p r a y i n g )
D o y o u a t t e n d F r i d a y p r a y e r ? ( 0 - 4 )
H o w o f t e n d o y o u a t t e n d
r e l i g i o u s s e r v i c e s ? ( 0 - 4 )
D o y o u p r a y i n C h u r c h
o r M o s q u e ( n o , y e s )
H o w o f t e n d o y o u
a t t e n d F r i d a y p r a y e r o r S u n d a y
s e r v i c e s ( 0 - 3 )
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B2.
continuedBelonging
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A
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C o u n t r y y e a r
T o w h a t e x t e n t
d o y o u c o n s i d e r y o u r s e l f
a s r e l i g i o u s ? ( n o t , s o m e w h a t ,
r e l i g i o u s )
A r e y o u a r e l i g i o u s p e r s o n ?
( y e s , n o i n c l . c o n v i n c e d a t h e i s t )
H o w i m p o r t a n t i s
r e l i g i o n i n y o u r l i f e ? ( 0 - 3 )
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D r i n k i n g a l c o h o l
E u t h a n a s i a
P a r t i c i p a t e i n a l o t t e r y
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Palestine 2010 X X X X X
Palestine 2013 X X X X X
Saudi Arabia
2003
X X X X X X X
Saudi Arabia
2011
X X X X X
Sudan 2011 X X X X X
Tunisia 2011 X X X X X
Tunisia 2013 X X X X X X X
Yemen 2007 X X X X X X X
Yemen 2011 X X X X X
Yemen 2014 X X X X X X X
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Appendix C1. Descriptive statistics of micro-level variables
Variable Mean SD Min Max Frequency
Tolerance
Ethno-religious social tolerance 0.00 0.73 −3.62 2.05
Religion
Belonging (religious identification) 0.02 0.86 −11.77 1.60
Majority status
Muslim 94.3
Non-Muslims 5.7
Scriptural literalism 0.01 0.83 −2.94 6.13
Religious in-group orientation 0.02 0.91 −4.28 2.04
Attendance 0.00 1.00 −5.74 1.68
Controls
Employment
Employed 62.6
Retired 3.7
Housewife 20.1
Student 6.6
Not employed other 7.0
Education
No education 27.7
Primary completed 22.3
Secondary completed 27.8
At least some tertiary 22.2
Sex
Male 51.2
Female 48.8
Age (in 7 cat.) 1.77 1.42 0 6
Marital status
Married 64.5
Single 30.4
Other (incl. divorced, widowed) 5.1
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Appendix C2. Macro-level scores per country or country year
Country year
Religious
fractiona
lizationa
Religion-based
violenceb
Religion-based
violencec
Orthodox Islam being
repressedd
Hegemonic Islamic
statee
Islamists in
powerf
Algeria 0.0091 0.54
Algeria 2002 0.73 0 0 0
Algeria 2006 0.67 0 0 0
Algeria 2011 0.55 0 1 0
Algeria 2013 0.54 0 1 0
Bahrain 0.5528 0.39
Bahrain 2009 0.39 1 1 0
Egypt 0.1979 0.77
Egypt 2001 0.80 1 0 0
Egypt 2011 0.77 0 0 0
Iraq 0.4844 0.80
Iraq 2004 0.77 0 0 0
Iraq 2006 0.87 0 0 0
Iraq 2011 0.78 0 0 0
Iraq 2013 0.82 0 0 0
Jordan 0.0659 0.44
Jordan 2001 0.40 0 0 0
Jordan 2006 0.47 0 0 0
Jordan 2010 0.56 0 0 0
(Continued)
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Appendix C2. continued
Country year
Religious
fractiona
lizationa
Religion-based
violenceb
Religion-based
violencec
Orthodox Islam being
repressedd
Hegemonic Islamic
statee
Islamists in
powerf
Jordan 2014 0.32 0 0 0
Lebanon 0.7886 0.63
Lebanon 2007 0.54 0 0 0
Lebanon 2011 0.57 0 0 0
Lebanon 2013 0.78 1 0 0
Libya 0.0570 0.82
Libya 2014 0.82 0 0 0
Morocco 0.0035 0.33
Morocco 2001 0.53 1 0 0
Morocco 2006 0.80 1 0 0
Morocco 2007 0.33 1 0 0
Palestine 0.1719 0.74
Palestine 2010 0.69 −1 0 1
Palestine 2013 0.79 −1 0 1
Saudi Arabia 0.1270 0.59
Saudi Arabia
2003
0.50 −1 0 1
Saudi Arabia
2011
0.59 −1 1 1
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Sudan 0.43071 0.58
Sudan 2011 0.58 −1 0 1
Tunisia 0.0104 0.43
Tunisia 2011 0.26 −1 0 1
Tunisia 2013 0.59 0 0 0
Yemen 0.0023 0.66
Yemen 2007 0.64 −1 0 1
Yemen 2011 0.71 −1 1 1
Yemen 2014 0.63 −1 1 1
aSource: Alesina et al. (2003).
bSource: Own calculations based on GRRD data.
cOwn calculations based on GRRD and IRF data, scores in italics are IRF based.
dSource: coded by author.
eSource: based on GRRD, Spierings, Smits, and Verloo (2009) and Spierings (2015).
fSource: code by author.
Notes: (1) This figure is from before South Sudan became an independent country; however, taking this into account when assessing the macro-level plots does not
suggest this has refutes the hypothesis on the moderation impact of religious fractionalization.
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Appendix D1. Robustness analyses of main analyses (cf. Table 1, Model 1)
Robustness test with data available for most surveys Robustness test only possible on a small subset of surveys
Original model:
Table 1, Model 1 A: Only Muslim
B: Including
income
C: DV on two
items (0-2)
D: All of the
before
E: Including
moral
cosmology
F1: ethno-religious
family tolerance as
DVa
F2: Original
model on same
casesa
Effects of interest: religiosity
Belonging −0.0088* −0.0086# −0.0028 −0.0208*** −0.0191*** −0.0154* −0.0155 0.0170
Scriptural literalism 0.0124** 0.0157** 0.0230*** 0.0094# 0.0203*** 0.0271*** −0.0807* −0.003
Moral cosmology:
importance of God in
your life (1–10)
0.0244***
Attendance −0.0224*** −0.0213*** −0.0206*** −0.0221*** −0.0185*** −0.0087# −0.0809* −0.0768***
Income (−2.47; 3.85) 0.0207*** 0.0184***
Model statistics
BIC 86,091.016 82,307.251 73,203.536 66,079.149 54159.629 50164.519 24,422.552 12,346
Nind 38,907 32,163 32,847 31,332 24,438 22,973 5,178 5,178
Nsrvy 32 32 32 29 28 16 5 5
Nctry 13 13 13 13 13 11 5 5
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; # p < .10.
Data source: AB and WVS surveys.
Notes (1) surveys included are: Algeria 2011, Iraq 2011, Sudan 2011, Tunisia 2011, Yemen 2011. All models are controlled for the same variables as given in table 1 Model, following the same
procedures.
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